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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Improving teamwork has become a major safety goal for healthcare organizations. Audit tools 
currently available are useful, but they remain inadequate because they are reactive and fail to provide context 
for “the interaction between people and the operational context (i.e., organizational, regulatory and 
environmental factors) within which people discharge their operational duties” (Maurino, 2005). Accurate 
and relevant information about real-world team behavior is theorized to confer the ability to address, 
through process design &/or training, significant issues which can then be re-assessed through repeat 
observations. In the mid-1990s, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) funded collaboration between 
the University of Texas and Continental Airlines to directly observe in-flight behaviors associated with safety 
and risk. This methodology, now known as the Line Operation Safety Audit (LOSA), was instrumental in 
developing the Threat and Error Management (TEM) model of cockpit work performance. In 2006, the 
FAA made TEM-based LOSA a “voluntary safety recommendation,” and all major US commercial air 
carriers engage in this on a regular basis as a component of their safety management systems (FAA, 2006).  
This thesis describes the adaptation of LOSA to a Threat and Error Management-based Clinical 
Operation Safety Audit (COSA), and reports a series of 30 observations of trauma team activations in the 
Emergency Department at an American College of Surgeons accredited level 1 trauma center in the United 
States of America.  
Results of these observations showed discrepancies between work as designed and as executed, as 
well as other behaviors, associated with increased risk to patients. Analysis of data revealed important areas 
for targeted improvement based on risk created by the healthcare system during normal clinical operations.  
Systematic observation following the COSA protocol can become a vital and essential new tool to 
assist in improving patient safety in healthcare. The bulk of this thesis considers the criticality of context in 
work analysis throughout the discussion section. Though concepts of threats and undesired states were 
easily adaptable to healthcare, error was found to be too narrow a concept. I therefore propose discarding 
error for a more open and inclusive interpretation of performance: Task Adaptation. We therefore propose 
to widen our scope and continue to develop Threat Management and Task Adaptation-based COSA 
throughout the hospital to enhance system performance and improve patient safety. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This project began as an attempt to answer two questions: How do people work together in health 
care? Can the evolution of risk be detected during systematic observation of team performance? These arose 
from the great interest in healthcare for applying efforts perceived to have been useful in other fields such 
as aviation, especially in terms of teamwork (Frush, Leonard, & Frankel Allan, 2013). The parallels between 
aviation and healthcare have been well documented elsewhere, but one significant similarity has been the 
extremely hierarchical relationship between physicians, surgeons, trainees and nurses (Helmreich & Merritt, 
1998; Carney, West, Neily, Mills, & Bagian, 2010). The complexity of modern healthcare has produced great 
specialization in both physician and nursing areas (Jordan, 1985). Nearly every aspect of medical practice 
has fundamentally changed over the past 75 years, and the diagnostic and therapeutic work is now so widely 
distributed and interdependent among various team members that the idea of a patient having a single 
physician dictating care could reasonably be considered fictional (Jauhar, 2014). Perhaps paradoxically, the 
extraordinary expertise in many individuals – particularly in procedural medicine – is only demonstrable 
with a large array of other specialists managing increasingly complex tasks (Cassel & Reuben, 2011).  
For past thirty years the perception has existed that the inability of medical professionals to function 
well as a team has degraded care, even before the Institute of Medicine report raised an alarm regarding 
preventable harm (Leape, 1994; Kohn, Corrigan, & Donaldson, 2000). Social interactions were anecdotally 
understood to negatively or positively impact performance, but little debate occurred regarding the system 
within which actors performed (Leape, et al., 2012). The tacit assumption has been that everyone knows 
what to do and when to do it, and the only dilemma is effectively coordinating the work, and removing a 
few bad apples (The Joint Commission, 2008). It is in this context that improving teamwork in healthcare 
is currently considered to be something of a Holy Grail in patient safety. 
It is not surprising then that simulation training has come to be viewed as a viable method to 
decrease harm and to improve task performance (even though very few have suggested such training or 
other observations be continued after one is in practice) (Gawande, 2011). The only training in which 
physicians are regularly asked to demonstrate task proficiency is advanced cardiac or trauma life support, 
and these are the lowest fidelity simulations attainable (ATLS, 2012). Higher fidelity simulation is believed 
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to be a way for us to perfect our skills away from the patient, and decrease error leading to patient harm 
(Salas, Prince, Baker, & Shrestha, 1995). The advancement of teamwork training and the movement for 
simulation training have brought areas of task performance and social interactions to the forefront of 
thinking in healthcare (Frush, Leonard, & Frankel, 2013). Nevertheless, we remain less safe than we would 
like (Makary & Daniel, 2016). 
Our drive for changing rates of patient harm has, to some extent, put the cart before the horse; to 
alter outcomes we do not like we are attempting to change a process about which we understand little (Perry 
& Wears, 2012). To understand what effect improved teamwork might have for healthcare, it is important 
to understand what we already do while working together (Perry, Wears, & McDonald, 2013). We must 
have some understanding of how teams form and dissolve, how they organize their work, how the system 
shapes them and impacts their performance (Branlat & Woods, 2010). We must understand the context of 
their behavior to know how/what/where to make design changes (Conklin, 2016). This is the landscape for 
the questions that lead this thesis. What lens can we use to analyze how we are working and help us to 
determine if it is going well or not?  Literature review from both the state of teamwork training in healthcare 
as well as progress through the 1990’s in aviation pointed to the development of systematic observation 
through the Line Operation Safety Audit (LOSA) as a key element in understanding and shaping teamwork 
performance in the cockpit toward safety  (Tullo, 2010; Frush, Maynard, Koeble, & Schwendimann, 2013). 
The LOSA was developed to answer precisely the questions raised at the beginning of this paper: 
what are teams doing, and how are they managing risk (Klinect, 2005)? It was understood at the time that a 
discrepancy existed between activity demonstrated in simulations or check-line rides versus performance in 
regular flights, because inexplicable outcomes continued to occur (Klinect, 2005). Activity theory posits that 
all work consists of goals, tools, rules and roles (Engestrom, 2000). Helmreich and Klinect argued that to 
understand cockpit work flow in vivo, only a form of invasive monitoring would suffice, and they proposed 
systematic observation (Helmriech, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1998). They designed a strict protocol to minimize 
the Hawthorne effect and move observed behavior as close to “normal” as possible (Klinect, Murray, 
Merritt, & Helmriech, 2003). These included 10 specific processes, but arguably the most crucial were (1) 
voluntary participation on the part of the observed, (2) avoiding recording specific identifiers related to any 
observation, (3) maintenance of confidentiality by observers, and finally, (4) analysis of data only in aggregate 
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form. Each of these represented tradeoffs in ability to make granular corrections of work to gain two specific 
areas of knowledge about system performance. The first was a more realistic performance by the actor, i.e. 
as close as possible to normal work. The second was a deeper (and presumably more accurate) understanding 
of the system. These techniques rapidly led to a theory of cockpit work termed “threat and error 
management” (TEM) (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). 
TEM-based observation proposes that all work analysis must account for two types of variability: 
the first arising from the environment outside the actors control, and the second from normal human 
performance. Goals, rules, tools and roles may be essential to organize work for reproducibility, but normal 
work has the messiness of a chaotic, open system (Hollnagel & Amalberti, 2001). Guided by the work of 
James Reason, Helmreich et al expected errors to occur and hypothesized that a portion of teams’ work was 
to successfully mitigate these events (Reason, 1998). TEM postulates that successful work is defined by 
team performance appropriately righting the ship in the face of variability encountered and/or produced by 
the team (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). This variability can come from forces beyond the control of the actors 
(e.g. mechanical malfunctions or weather, termed “threats”) or be due to the actor’s own mistakes, slips or 
lapses (Reason’s taxonomy of “errors”) (Reason, 1990). It is important to understand that these factors 
often alter workflow in significant ways, and furthermore, that teams must use judgment regarding resource 
allocation to determine the necessity of addressing any specific threat or error (Klinect, 2005). The final 
element in the TEM model of safe work performance is that occasionally the team runs into a situation of 
high risk attributable to their own behavior – termed an Undesired State – and at this point the team must allocate 
resources to adjust course or face potential serious harm (Klinect, 2005). 
In Klinect’s own words, TEM-based LOSA can therefore be considered a “Swiss cheese measuring 
device”, designed to detect how adept the system is at identifying and plugging the holes in Reason’s model 
(as exemplified by the team performance at the sharp end). Klinect is honest about the limits of the Swiss 
cheese model; in his words “the cheese isn’t static – holes are growing and shrinking all the time” (Klinect, 
personal communication). TEM is simply a conceptualization of how a fluid system reshapes the cheese. 
From that point of view, TEM could also be considered a method of measuring how effective the system 
is at pushing work away from Rasmussen’s safety boundary through expenditures of dollars and/or effort 
(again, as exemplified by sharp end performance) (Rasmussen, 1997). In theory, TEM-based LOSA is a 
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measure of both the systems’ need for, and success at, flexible adjustment to the environment (Klinect, 
2005). Teams regularly prevent harm, and understanding these efforts is important because (a) they are 
efforts – i.e. they require resources and costs that further alter work flow, and (b) these efforts regularly go 
unnoticed despite near miss reporting. Often such prevention happens before a near miss could have been 
considered to occur. Unfortunately, teams’ adaptability to the flow of work can also create harm or increase 
the risk of harm (Reason, 2008). “Teams” here, should not be considered the human error icing on a well-
designed system. “Teams” are cognitive functions produced by the system and can in no way be considered 
separate from it (Salmon, Walker, & Stanton, 2015; Woods & Hollnagel, 2006). Like a chemical equation, 
risk is not static. It is always being created and mitigated and our desire is simply to understand the reactants 
and drive the equation in the appropriate direction given specific local conditions (Amalberti, 2013). 
Attempts to manipulate behavior in such a complex system must understand both where the risk is being 
created and resolved and this cannot be done irrespective of the local conditions (Braithwaite, Wears, & 
Hollnagel, 2015). In order to adequately understand the context of team behavior and the emergence of risk 
and safety, TEM-based systematic observation was explored as a method of evaluating normal work as done 
in a hospital setting.  
This report, therefore, summarizes the findings of the initial Threat and Error Management-based 
Clinical Operation Safety Audit (TEM-based COSA) done for Trauma Services at a major trauma center in 
the United States. This project was undertaken as a “proof of concept” study to determine if (1) Threat and 
Error Management (TEM) based systematic observation methods could be adapted to healthcare and (2) 
local risk attributable to system function within a specific clinical domain could be determined. If successful, 
this proactive safety management initiative would accurately describe system behavior that contributes to 
risk, allowing targeted performance improvement efforts within the system.  
The following report is in four parts: 
1. Description of the Clinical Observation Safety Audit (COSA) process 
2. Brief explanation Threat & Error Management (TEM) and the TEM cycle  
3. Review of data 
4. Discussion and proposal for adaptation to a new model of work. 
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This project adheres as closely as possible to the original methods and analysis of the LOSA as a 
starting point. Terms such as “error” and “risk attributable to team performance” are carried over from the 
LOSA lexicon. Bear with such phrasing for the time being; the discussion at the end will consider their 
utility. This discussion and the proposal for adapting to a new model of work serves as the bulk of this 
thesis.  
 
METHODS 
 
PART I: DESCRIPTION OF CLINICAL OBSERVATION SAFETY AUDITS (COSA) 
COSA utilizes systematic observation as a diagnostic test of basic operations following the 
operational characteristics of the original LOSA design (Klinect, Murray, Merritt, & Helmriech, 2003). The 
fundamental requirements of a LOSA are as follows: 
• Direct observation of the normal operations 
• Anonymous and non-punitive data collection  
• Voluntary participation  
• Trusted and trained observers 
• Joint sponsorship of the audits [between staff and organization] 
• Establishment of reliable and valid safety-targeted and teamwork-targeted data collection platform 
• Trusted data collection site  
• Data cleaning roundtables  
• Data derived targets for improvement  
• Results feedback to audited areas  
The underlying imperative in COSA, as in LOSA, is trust. The data collected must be a valid 
representation of work under normal operational conditions. To understand where risk is created under 
normal circumstances, one must create conditions of unique safety for the provider, such that the observed 
trust the process completely. First and foremost, this involves believing they can expose themselves and 
their thought processes without fear of retribution. Closely related to that is the need for the observed to 
feel no internal pressure to perform out of the ordinary. Any sense the observed have that they should “turn 
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it on” for the observer must be squelched, and for this reason all observations begin with an introduction 
by the observer and a request for permission to observe at that specific time. The observed have the right 
to refuse any observation without question. During the introduction and request, it is stressed to those who 
are agreeing to be observed that the goal is not to judge their performance but to look at how all aspects of 
the system respond to each other. If the observed have any internal stressors they feel will prevent 
themselves from behaving normally, they are encouraged to decline observation.  
Observers must be specifically trained in Threat and Error Management observation techniques, 
and be trusted by both the observed and the institution as being respectful of confidentiality, nonbiased, 
and competent in their observations.  The entire process should be jointly managed, such that neither staff 
nor management can be perceived as owning either the audit process or the data. Ideally both the staff and 
management will perceive the COSA as an opportunity for each to learn valuable information they can use 
to improve system performance rather than any specific individual performance. All data must be collected 
systematically (achieved through observer training), and recorded in a platform that permits analysis of both 
threat and error management and teamwork behaviors. (This will be described in more detail below.) Data 
must be stored in a secure site that does not permit extraction of individual team performance. Even though 
all data is recorded without specific identifiers, any sense that an individual or team’s confidence is betrayed 
by the COSA process will derail the trust necessary for staff to work as normally as possible in front of the 
observer.  
Observer bias is inherent in systematic observation, so all data must be “cleaned”. Following 
completion of data collection, a Data Cleaning Roundtable (DCRT) is convened, consisting of members of 
the COSA project team, representatives of hospital Quality and Safety, and representatives of the various 
observed staff positions (e.g. nursing, physicians, techs, etc.) who were not themselves subject to 
observation. It is important that these representatives be trusted by both frontline staff and management. 
Each data point submitted is reviewed aby the data cleaning roundtable to ensure that errors are accurately 
codified and to reach consensus that data point along with the accompanying narrative is accurately 
substantiated in the narrative record.  
The final two elements necessary for effective COSA are transparency within the organization and 
utility of the data. COSA data must be presented openly with direct feedback about the data to observed 
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areas (though not specific feedback to observed participants) and targeted areas for improvement. These 
elements are necessary for the observed to ensure their personal exposure was worth the risk involved. 
Similarly, the entire undertaking must provide actionable data for the institution to perceive adequate return 
on investment.  This initial COSA adhered closely to those operational requirements as outlined above.   
 
OBSERVER TRAINING Observer training is a two-step process. The first step is a four-hour course 
in teamwork skills. This is followed by a two-day classroom session teaching concepts of: 
• Threat and Error Management Cycle  
• Effective note taking 
• Narrative writing 
• Classification of Threats, Errors and Undesired States 
• Observation conduct – especially including voluntary nature of the observations and the 
need for observer to maintain an anodyne presence during observation 
     This endeavor is the first of its kind, and there is currently no standard for TEM-based 
systematic observation training in healthcare. The author sought guidance from Dr. Klinect, who generously 
permitted the author and an anesthesiologist colleague to attend training intended for pilot observers as 
guests of the LOSA Collaborative and Hawaiian Airlines. The training uses vignettes to standardize 
observers to identify teamwork skills and view each observation as a series of team threat and error 
management events. Initial trial observations were done in the operating suite by both of the observers who 
had attended the pilot training. Five of these observations were done as a test by simultaneous observation 
of operative cases by the two observers as well as an operating room nurse. Narratives and coding of TEM 
by the teams were done separately by these three observers, and these were then compared to assess our 
perceived ability to adequately capture the nature of events both socially and clinically. The only 
discrepancies noted in these comparisons were domain specific technical issues within our respective realms 
(anesthesia, nursing and surgery). Based on these comparisons, we believed the systematic observation 
methods involved in LOSA to be both adaptable to healthcare, and worth the larger evaluation described 
herein. None of those trial observations are included in this analysis, as they served as a learning experience 
for the author and the hospital. The data collected for this study was collected by a single observer (the 
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author), and subject to review by the usual LOSA protocol for data cleaning roundtable, further described 
below.  
 
OBSERVATION PROTOCOL and DATA COLLECTION  Each observation begins with the 
observer formally requesting permission to observe the providers, and reminding them that (1) it is the 
overall system performance that is being evaluated rather than the individual provider, and (2) no identifying 
data will be recorded with respect to any individual observed.  
Duration of the observation for the Trauma Activations during this pilot study involved only the 
period between trauma alert page from the operator until the patient’s work-up in the trauma bay was 
complete and the patient was moved to the next stage (i.e. to CT scan, the operating room, etc.). The start 
and end points for observations are inherently somewhat arbitrary, and the most important point is that 
they are adequately established to capture useful data for the clinical area/work being evaluated.  
Each observation concludes with the observer thanking the observed. Our protocol adds two 
questions to the observed at this time:  
1. What do you perceive to be the greatest safety risk in your work environment? (This 
question is purposely left open to be answered with respect to staff or patients.) 
2. Do you feel the presence of the observer altered either your or anyone else’s behavior 
during the observation, and if so, how? 
This data is recorded with each observation for analysis in aggregate.  
     Observations record behavior of the team in note format, and immediately following the 
observation, a detailed narrative is constructed to provide context for all team behaviors. It is extremely 
important that this is done while the observation is fresh in the mind of the observer for adequate contextual 
understanding of the event. This narrative provides context for the threat and error management strategies 
employed. The data is logged into a password protected computer. The goal of the observer is to collect 
descriptive data of team performance with respect to the TEM cycle (as described in part II below) and 
teamwork performance markers (as described in part III below). Approximately 80% of a high-quality 
narrative will be descriptions of human performance with respect to the TEM cycle, and the remaining 20% 
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should be narrative glue to provide context for both team decision making and rationale for observer coding. 
(LOSA Collaborative observer training, Hawaiian Airlines, 2014)  
     In addition to team management strategies, milestone events within the trauma activation were 
recorded for all observations. These included timing of specific events such as Trauma Attending arrival, 
patient entry, first and successive vital signs, blood gas, labs, abdominal ultrasound examination, and chest 
x-ray, were recorded as able based on other events occurring during the activation. Inclusion criteria for 
observations included trauma level I or II and availability of observer to observe case in its entirety. Trauma 
activations were considered as having three separate phases based on American College of Surgeons’ 
Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS) guidelines: Prearrival, Patient Entry, and Survey/Resuscitation. The 
Prearrival phase began as soon as the trauma alert went out through the paging system, and ended with 
patient entry into the room. Patient Entry began with Emergency Medical Services (EMS) bringing patient 
into the room and ended with patient being moved from EMS stretcher to the trauma bay stretcher. The 
ATLS phases of Primary and Secondary surveys and ongoing resuscitation could rarely be clearly separated, 
so were considered together as the Survey/Resuscitation phase, starting with patient positioning on the 
trauma bay stretcher. Detailed analysis of the team behaviors documented in the narrative followed the 
Threat and Error Management Cycle.   
 
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS The project was undertaken as a Performance Improvement 
Project within the Trauma Service, under a waiver from the Institutional Review Board. As a quality 
improvement project, patient consent is deemed unnecessary.   
     No patient identifiers were recorded. Patient information was only recorded with respect to age, 
history as reported by the emergency medical transport team, and vital signs during the course of the trauma 
activation. No staff identifiers were recorded. All staff members were described by title only, and no sex 
pronouns were used in the narrative to further protect the observed. In all cases, consent was obtained from 
the staff to be observed prior to the observation. Time of day and day of week were recorded, but not date 
of observation. It should be noted that the observer is obligated to intervene if they see the potential for 
imminent patient harm.  
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TEAMWORK PERFORMANCE MARKERS The narrative was deconstructed to document all 
instances of teamwork skills behaviors (as shown in table 1) and Teamwork Performance Markers (TPM) 
were scored on a Likert scale in the domains of Overall Climate, Planning, Execution and Review/Modify. 
Each of these domains has been considered to contain teamwork skills critical for threat, error &/or 
undesired state management. (see Table 1). Each team was thus evaluated separately for Teamwork 
Performance Markers and Threat and Error Management. 
 
  
 
OVERALL CLIMATE PLANNING EXECUTION REVIEW/MODIFY 
Leadership SOP 
Briefings 
Monitor/ 
Crosscheck 
Inquiry  
Communication 
environment 
Contingency 
management 
Workload 
management 
Evaluation of plans 
Overall 
performance 
Plans stated  Assertiveness 
 
 
DATA CLEANING Each Threat, Error and Undesired State was reviewed through the entire 
management cycle during data cleaning round table discussions to arrive at consensus with respect to validity 
and accuracy. Representatives of each major trauma team role were present for these discussions, including 
trauma surgeons, emergency department physicians, nursing, and surgical residents. Additional 
representatives from hospital patient safety leadership, and TeamSTEPPS® master trainers were also 
present at each discussion. During this process no data points were discarded, but several threats and errors 
were added based on data from the narratives.  
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS Microsoft Excel was used to aggregate the thirty observations and to 
perform graphical and statistical analysis of data. Prevalence of threats and errors were tabulated per the 
following qualitative variables: case, phase, category, outcomes and response.  
Comparisons between categorical variables of team response versus outcome were tested by use of 
contingency tables to generate a management index. The “management index” is the percentage of a threat 
or error that are linked to downstream error. Threat and error responses were grouped as ‘aware’ versus 
Table 1: Teamwork Performance  Markers 
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‘unaware’. An ‘aware’ response is defined as a threat response of ‘anticipated’ or an error response of 
‘detected and acted upon’ or ‘ignored’.  An ‘unaware’ response is defined as a threat response of ‘pop-up 
threat’ or ‘unanticipated’, or an error response of ‘undetected’ or ‘detected by external’. Aware versus 
unaware responses were divided by linked outcomes for determination of management index. ‘Linked’ 
outcome is defined as a threat outcome of ‘linked to team error’ or an error outcome of ‘additional team 
error’ and ‘undesired state’.  Chi-square test was used to determine significance between relationship of 
response awareness and linked outcome. 
 
 
PART II: THREAT & ERROR MANAGEMENT AND THE TEM CYCLE 
The primary analysis considers threat and error management (TEM) strategies performed by the 
team. TEM is founded on the premise that nearly all team activities involve threats the team must manage 
and small deviations from expected behavior (errors) that influence the team’s or patient’s exposure to risk. 
Increased exposure to risk secondary to team error is considered an “Undesired State”. Threats, Errors, and 
Undesired States are defined as follows:  
      
TEM-based COSA evaluates what teams do or do not do to manage these situations as they are 
confronted by them, and describes the conditions that give rise to increased risk attributable to team 
behavior. Each threat is broken down as follows: description of the threat, description of steps taken to 
manage (if any); phase of occurrence; team member (by role) who identified the threat; team response; and 
outcome. “Team response” to threats is considered in terms of team preparation. For example, team 
Term Definition 
Threat 
An event that occurs outside the influence of the healthcare team, 
increases the operational complexity of the care, and requires team 
attention and management if safety margins are to be maintained. 
Error 
Action or inaction that leads to a deviation from team or organizational 
intentions or expectations. 
Undesired State 
A position or condition that clearly reduces safety margins and is the result 
of actions by the healthcare team 
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response to each threat could be considered “Anticipated” – team considered the threat and took steps to 
manage it, “Unanticipated” – team could have planned for the threat but did not, or “Pop-up Threat” – 
team had no opportunity to consider the threat prior its presentation. Each threat was considered to have a 
binary Outcome: either “Linked to Team Error”, or “Inconsequential”.  
     The threat  response  outcome cycle, with examples, is shown below:  
 
     Errors were defined as deviations from behavior expected by either the team member or the 
organization. Errors were broadly categorized as Handling, Procedural or Communication types, and further 
broken down into subcategories as appropriate. Handling errors were considered to fall under the domains 
of Technical Proficiency (e.g. intravenous line placement) or Judgment (e.g. decision to transfuse). 
Procedural errors are equivalent to “Standard Operating Procedures”, such as use of a Pre-arrival Checklist, 
maintaining sterile precautions, or crosschecking a bed being locked prior to transfer. Communication errors 
are categorized as occurring within the team (Team-Team), between the team and the outside world (Team-
External) or between the Team and the Patient.  
     Separate descriptions of each error managed by the team included: description of error, 
description of management, phase of the occurrence, team member (by title) responsible for any error, team 
member (by title) who identified error, and outcome. Team response to error considered two factors: their 
awareness of the error and actions taken.  Teams that detect an error may consider the error important to 
fix and act upon it in some way, or they may choose to ignore it. On the other hand, an error may go entirely 
unnoticed by teams. At other times the potential for harm may be so high that the observer or another 
outside entity may be the first to notice the error and bring it to the teams’ attention. All Error outcomes 
were either considered Inconsequential, i.e. they led to no further error or undesired state, or Linked to 
another event (either subsequent error or undesired state).  The Error  Response  Outcome cycle is 
shown schematically below: 
Threat
• staffing
• patient 
condition
• prehospital care
Response
• anticipated
• unanticipated
• pop-up 
Outcome
• inconsequential
• linked to error
17 
 
 
    Within the scope of this project an “Undesired State” is defined as a situation where harm (to 
patient or staff) has been made significantly more likely as a result of team error. These are generally categorized 
in terms of patient physiology as relating to airway, breathing, circulatory, metabolic or neurologic 
compromises of some type. In addition, they can include “Configuration State”, which is a state of physical 
positioning of the patient that is known or presumed to increase risk. Examples of configuration states are: 
moving a patient without the bed locked, failing to stabilize the cervical spine in a trauma patient, having 
the wrong site prepped prior to a procedure, or expired or incorrect instruments/medication present in a 
room with a patient.  
     Undesired State (US) management and outcomes are considered in a similar fashion to errors. 
Each US is described and then analyzed for team management, response (with options identical to Error 
responses) and outcome. The possible outcomes for an Undesired State are Inconsequential, Linked to 
Team Error or Harm (to patient or staff).  Examples of Undesired States and the Undesired States Cycle 
are shown below: 
 
     Using the methods above, TEM-based COSA captures the entire management process, such 
that each Threat, Error and Undesired State is described relative to the team response and the outcome. 
Undesired State
• expired 
medication in 
room
• loss of  airway
• hemorrhage
Response
• Detected & 
Acted Upon
• Ignored
• Undetected
• Detected by 
External
Outcome
• Inconsequential
• Linked to 
further team 
error
• Harm
Error Type 
•Handling
•Procedural
•Communication
Response
•Detected & Acted 
Upon
•Ignored
•Undetected
•Detected by 
External
Outcome
• Inconsequential
• Lined to further 
team error
• Linked to 
Undesired State
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Through this process, team behavior is given context as threat and error management behaviors are 
understood. Each observation is considered as a series of Threat  Response  Outcome, Error  
Response  Outcome, and occasionally Undesired State  Response  Outcome cycles.  Each 
observation therefore unfolds as though the team is traversing a maze, navigating and managing obstacles, 
some of which are their own creation. 
 
RESULTS 
THREATS  
Every team had to manage complexity outside their control generated by another portion of the 
system (from prehospital care to our own hospital). Average threats per team was 2.4, with a range from 1-
7.  31% of patients could be considered to have conditions that were their own threats, for which ATLS 
algorithms are designed. Total threat prevalence by type is listed in Table 2. 
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9%
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                OSH
             Pharmacy
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             PATIENT
               Room
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TABLE 2:  Threat Prevalence
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Sample size limits interpretation of less frequent types, but for threats occurring in more than 5% 
of the cases a Management Index could be calculated based on the threat exposure and the likelihood of 
linkage to a team error. This is shown in table 3.   
 
 
 
      As an example, 18% of teams had a threat associated with Emergency Medical Technician 
(EMT) management of the patient, often something as simple as failing to obtain spinal stabilization. 9% of 
all teams had linkage of a threat posed by EMT to a team error, leading to a 50% rate of mismanagement 
of threats associated with EMTs. Generally speaking, with respect to threat management, our system 
performed as desired about 50% of the time (i.e. teams managed threats without linkage to a downstream 
“error” approximately 50% of the time). It is nearly impossible to interpret this raw number without an 
understanding of context. One simply cannot say whether such a high rate represents appropriate ability to 
adapt performance to local situation, or whether system constraints on performance are too loose or even 
unrealistically tight. We can, however, draw some conclusions regarding the utility of threat preparation 
when considering linkage rates among various types of threat response. The analysis of threat management 
incorporates planning, as threats are considered to be of two basic types: pop-up, or known. Known threats 
can be anticipated or unanticipated (i.e. the team could plan for managing the threat, or they could simply 
decide to improvise should the threat present itself1). Our evidence supports the benefit of planning, as 
threat management was significantly improved when teams considered the threat in advance: When 
considered in terms of threats that were anticipated, i.e. planned for through open discussion by the team, 
linkage to error dropped from 53% to 21%. This was statistically significant, with a p value of 0.01. 
       
 
                                                          
1 COSA makes no judgements about whether threat anticipation is good or bad. We are concerned with what 
pattern of downstream actions is associated with threat anticipation v. non-anticipation.  
TABLE 3: Threat Management 
Index 
18%
31%
13% 9% 9%9%
15%
7% 3% 4%
50% 48%
56%
33%
50%
0%
20%
40%
60%
EMT PATIENT STAFFING Room Multiple Traumas
Prevalence by Category Management Index Total Management Index by Category
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ERRORS 
     Errors were considered to be one of three types as described by Klinect (Klinect, 2005). 
Procedural errors are failure to follow defined protocol or policy. Communication errors may be failure to 
use standard communication techniques, such as read-back of information, or as obvious misunderstandings 
during communication. Handling errors are largely technical in nature, but could also include judgment. As 
shown in table 4, Procedural errors were far more common in this series. Management indices were 
equivalent between error types, but procedural types accounted for significantly more Undesired States than 
either Handling or Communication errors. One out every five errors was linked to an Undesired State, and 
over 50% all Undesired States were associated with Procedural errors. Most of these were associated with 
configuration states encountered during patient entry. 
 
HANDLING ERRORS  Handling errors showed no patterns whatsoever, and appeared to be the result 
of random slips, lapses or mistakes as expected. Only four of the linked Handling errors could be considered 
technical or skill based.  
     It may be notable that the Undesired States appeared more associated with judgment errors than 
technical proficiency, though the sample size is small and the categorization is too difficult to say with any 
certainty at this point. It is also notable that many of the events we consider “errors” are so rapidly resolved 
during normal workflow they can appear and disappear as quickly as keystroke mistakes that are 
19% 18%
62%
100%
6% 5%
18%
30%33% 29% 29% 30%
4% 3%
11%
19%
COMMUNICATION Handling Procedural Grand Total
Table 4: Errors with Linked Outcomes
Total by Category
Management Index Total
Management Index by Category (linked outcomes
total)
Linked to US
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‘autocorrected’ by the computer on which this is typed. This is a critical value of such an observational 
process, and will be revisited in the discussion.  
COMMUNICATION ERRORS  Communication errors occurred almost entirely within the team. 
Five out of seven of the linked communication errors led directly to Undesired States. 
PROCEDURAL ERRORS  Procedural errors, like Handling errors, were wide ranging, but unlike 
Handling errors, they occurred with a frequency that did permit some patterns to emerge. Overwhelmingly, 
the procedural errors were related to either:  
I. the communication environment in the room (through a failure to maintain sterile 
communications, failure to callout information or give/receive report),   
II. failure to crosscheck leading to configuration state  
III. failure to use checklist 
     The checklist was never used as intended – i.e. with full team attention, completed, and in sterile 
fashion. In addition, for two thirds of the study it was inaccurate because of policy changes within the 
trauma service that had not been refleted in the printed checklist in the room. The most complete checklist 
usage witnessed was when the entire list was run through by the team leader (almost always the resident 
prior to trauma attending arrival), but never with full attention from the team. Because this was the cultural 
norm, errors were only coded when deviations from that standard occurred.  
     More than half of the linkages for procedural errors led directly to Undesired State (20/33). 
These consisted of: 17 crosscheck errors leading to configuration states or loss of spinal precautions, 1 
nonsterile handoff, 1 failure to callout, and 1 failure to complete the checklist.   
 
PHASE EFFECTS ON THREAT AND ERROR MANAGEMENT 
     All threats, errors and undesired states were coded for phase of activation, considered to be 
either Prearrival, Patient Entry or Primary/Secondary Survey. Rates of “Linked to US” derived from: Linked 
to US/total error in phase. 
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PHASE THREAT 
PREVALENCE 
MI ERROR 
PREVALENCE 
MI LINKED 
TO US 
Prearrival 42% 39% 16% 28% 10% 
Patient Entry 19% 46% 23% 48% 38% 
Primary/Secondary 39% 42% 62% 24% 14% 
 
Notable findings include: 
➢ Management index was worst for both Threats and Errors during Patient Entry phase. 
➢ Errors occurring during the Patient Entry stage had an extremely high likelihood of leading to US 
(approximately twice the rate of errors at other phases).  
Undesired State linkage by phase showed other characteristics as well. 
➢ All 3 Prearrival errors leading to US created the same type of US, and were caused by the same 
threat. Despite this similarity, they differed with respect to error type (one each for Handling, 
Communication & Procedural) as well as incident response (one undetected, one ignored and one 
detected and acted upon).  
➢ All Patient Entry errors leading to US were Procedural Errors leading to Configuration State 
(described below). 
➢ 80% of mismanaged threats occurring during Patient Entry led to a subsequent Undesired State, 
and these were just as likely to lead to a physiologic Undesired States (e.g. diagnostic error/delay, 
hemodynamic instability). 
Primary/Secondary Survey errors leading to Undesired States were relatively evenly split between 
error types. Again, most of these (57%) were conditions other than a Configuration State. 
 
UNDESIRED STATES 
     Undesired States occurred 35 times in our series, and in 70% of the trauma activations.  Level I 
trauma activations occurred 14 times in the series, with 12 (86%) presenting direct from the field and 2 
occurring as transfers. The level I activations accounted for 57% (20/35) of the Undesired States, and nearly 
Table 5: Phase effects of Threat & Error Management 
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half of the observed US (45%) in level I activations were not considered Configuration States.  In contrast, 
only 20% of the undesired states in the level II activations were not related to Configuration States.  
Configuration States were nearly always the result of procedural errors, and occasionally (two instances) 
related to communication errors. They were also almost entirely related to one of the three issues: 
I. failure to secure bed prior to patient transfer  
II. failure to stabilize cervical spine prior to transfer  
III. failure to protect patient with side rails being up when leaving patient unattended   
 
For Undesired States not categorized as Configuration States, error types were very different. In 
these cases, 62% (8/13) were related to Team-Team Communication errors, 38% were related to Handling 
errors (5/13 - all judgment errors), and only one occurred subsequent to a Procedural error (nonsterile 
checklist). Half of the communication errors were failure to acknowledge communication, and the others 
were some type of failure to offer information (failure to assert, failure to callout finding, offering unclear 
directions). All the judgment errors were errors of omission, commonly considered to be related to poor 
situational awareness (not attending to novice staff, not reconsidering medication dosing given patient’s 
history, and not attending to the need for sterility during central line placement).  
 
TEAMWORK PERFORMANCE  
     All teams were also evaluated for Teamwork Performance Markers (TPM) on a Likert scale in 
the domains shown in Table 1 (page 10).  
     Analysis of Teamwork Performance Markers showed our teams were normally distributed with 
respect to demonstration of teamwork skills.  We sought to determine what differences existed with respect 
to TPM between the teams a standard deviation above and below the mean for risk mitigation. To do so, 
we considered both the teams’ propensity for error as well as their propensity for poor management of 
threats and errors and established a Management Ratio as shown below: Linked Events/Total Error = 
Management Ratio.  A lower Management Ratio would correspond to a teams’ improved ability to 
autocorrect for error. 
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We then compared the teams a standard deviation above and below the mean Management Ratio 
in terms of their Teamwork Performance Markers (TPM). Figure 1 shows “Good TEM” performers in blue 
(those with a better Management Ratio) and “Poor TEM performers in orange. The Y-axis is the average 
Likert scale score for Teamwork Performance Markers. There was a strong trend toward a significant 
difference in domains of Planning, Review/Modify and Overall Climate for teams who were better TEM 
performers (p=0.1). Given the very small numbers involved it is not surprising that we failed to see 
statistically significant differences between groups. Despite that, every one of the “Poor TEM” teams had 
at least one physiologic Undesired State (some had multiple), while only one “Good TEM” team had a 
single Undesired State. This difference between the two groups was highly significant (p=0.001) 
 
 
DISCUSSION 
      
     Although the chronologic flow of teamwork as considered by TEM is threat  response  
outcome, error  response  outcome, potentially followed by creation of an Undesired State, I will begin 
with US in this discussion, because they represent at least a “near miss”, and often a “no-harm” event.2 (The 
Joint Commission, 2016) Rather than consider them as the fault of the team, we should consider undesired states 
as risk resulting from normal system function. 
                                                          
2 Remember that Undesired States exist in two basic categories: physiologic abnormalities that must be 
corrected or configuration states known to produce high risk of harm. 
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Figure 1: Correlation of TEM per rmance and Teamwork P rformance Markers 
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     Irrespective of the COSA, with respect to outcomes our trauma service regularly has an 
observed to expected mortality ratio of less than one, and this was no different during the period of these 
observations (Trauma Registry data). From an outcome point of view, therefore, these teams function 
particularly well.  Furthermore, the COSA process observed no harm occur to any patients or staff. 
Systematic observation of system function nevertheless revealed a high prevalence of undesired states. These 
are meaningful to us in the same way that near miss reporting is meaningful: they represent opportunities 
for the system to learn and improve. One critical value of COSA is the ability to see work flow with much 
more granularity and decipher patterns within the system (Klinect, 2005). For example: during the period 
of our evaluations, we had a 6% rate of anonymous incident reporting during the first 24 hours of a patient’s 
stay on the trauma service (Hospital Quality Data). Our observations, however, showed Undesired States 
occurred in 70% of the trauma activations and 35 times in our series. This represented risk created during, 
on average, the patient’s first 22 minutes in the hospital. What risk did this represent? 
     First consider configuration states, as these were both the most prevalent and, also, because they 
can be tricky to understand. In our series they were overwhelmingly one of three types:  
I. Transferring a patient without cervical spine stabilization 
II. Leaving patient unattended with side rails down 
III. Transferring a patient from stretcher to bed without securing either of them  
Each of these represents a known risk which, though very small, is also very real. We have protocols 
in place to make sure that none of these events occurs, and yet one or all of them occurred more often than 
not. Each of these was also associated with a unique pattern of system function, as described below.  
     Maintaining cervical stabilization receives the highest degree of attention by the system of these 
three. The potential for cervical spine injury is discussed often, in every trauma patient. Teams jockey over 
appropriate removal of the prophylactic cervical spine collar placed to protect each patient on a daily basis 
throughout the hospital.  The observed teams commented on this in one way or another for each of the 
three cases involved where a collar was not immediately applied. In the first case the team leader assumed 
(correctly) that a collar would not have been placed in the field, based on the prehospital report. From a 
TEM standpoint, this would be considered an anticipated threat, because the team planned for an expected 
additional work due to the high potential for a cervical injury, the expectation that patient would not have 
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had collar placed prior to arrival, and the desire to follow protocol. Nevertheless, on arrival the team was 
consumed with attention to the report from the emergency transport team and for beginning to care for the 
patient, so no collar was placed until after the patient was moved. In the second case, the absence of the 
collar was noticed only after transfer of the patient to the bed. Prehospital providers had attempted to place 
the collar in the field, but they could not because the neck was “too short”. They improvised with a towel 
taped to the backboard because of their perception of a very high potential for cervical injury in that patient.3 
In the third case, the patient was transferred from another hospital with a known spine injury. This patient 
arrived without a collar and a report that the spine had been cleared at the outside hospital. Since he was 
being transferred for a spine injury he had a higher than usual chance of an associated cervical injury, and it 
is a protocol to not accept outside assessment of the spine because transferring centers often perform what 
our radiologists consider to be substandard imaging (ATLS, 2012). Nevertheless, in this case no-one 
questioned the outside reading or the decision to leave a collar off the patient.  
     In each of these cases there was clear deviation from standard operating procedures, and there 
was at least some increased degree of risk. This is made more concerning when considered against the 
backdrop of the remaining 22 cases where a cervical collar was indicated by protocol4, all of whom either 
presented with collars in place or had cervical collars placed immediately. Most notably, in the four of those 
cases where a patient presented without a collar and a collar was placed by the trauma team prior to patient 
transfer to the trauma bed from the EMS stretcher, protocol was followed even though the acuity of the 
patient was very low and there was virtually no specific risk given the patient’s injury and presentation. In the three 
cases where collar placement was indicated because of mechanism but it was not placed, however, the 
patient was in a more precarious state, though in none of them was the patient exhibiting any signs of acute 
physiologic instability. In these cases, the staff – even having planned for the fact that a collar might not 
have been placed by the prehospital providers – focused on other issues they immediately felt to be 
important. We can only hypothesize why this is based on the observations, but we can clearly say at this 
point that the system was aware of the need for a collar and produced it as necessary 88% of the time, in a 
                                                          
3 This unfortunately falls outside the scope of our evaluation, but their adaptation is fundamental to the 
argument for disabusing ourselves of the concept of error. The EMTs practiced what medicine has been since 
Hippocrates: They understood the potential problem and worked to solve it with the tools they had.   
4 Five of the cases were penetrating traumas where a collar was not indicated. 
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situation where missing an occult injury can be catastrophic and would certainly be considered a “never 
event”.  
     The second most common configuration state occurred during a moment where each patient 
gets a chest x-ray approximately 10 minutes into the resuscitation. The entire staff leaves the trauma bay 
during the x-ray in order to avoid unnecessary exposure to radiation, and the patient is left alone on the 
stretcher. Some x-ray technicians raised one or both side rails on the stretcher and some did not. There is 
no hard protocol for this moment within the trauma resuscitation, though there is a basic principle that 
patients who should not be out of bed, and certainly patients who cannot follow instructions, are not left 
unattended with side rails down. Despite the patient being left alone for only a matter of seconds, there 
were at least two unrelated instances where patients who were believed to be sedated suddenly sat up. Both 
of those times happened to be when staff was in the room during other portions of the trauma team’s work, 
but it would seem to be a simple stochastic event at some point leading to a patient falling out of the 
stretcher when the team has walked away for the x-ray. During observations, however, the odds that the 
railing would be raised approached that of a coin toss.  
     The third, and by far the most common configuration state, was transferring the patient from the EMS 
stretcher to the trauma bay stretcher without pausing to make sure the stretchers were stabilized. Unlike the 
previous two, observation of this team behavior yielded a consistent pattern of failing to check the stretchers 
were stabilized. Patients do fall to the ground during such transfers (though extremely rarely) and severe 
injuries and even fatalities have been reported. It is expected practice, therefore, that the team checks the 
two surfaces (stretchers and/or beds) to be locked prior to transfer. From an ergonomics point of view, this 
is an extremely weak barrier defense in that it relies on human memory for occurrence (Reason, 1990; 
Kahneman, 2011). Nevertheless, there is currently no stretcher technology that produces automatic locking 
and requires human involvement for initiation of movement, so the action relies on the collective memory 
of the team. The odds of the system successfully remembering this based on my observations were nearly 
the inverse of the likelihood the team would place a cervical collar, i.e. approximately 15%.  
THE CRITICAL IMPORTANCE OF CONTEXT IN EVALUATING WORK 
     It is important to understand that these are extremely different types of events, appearing to 
represent extremely different levels of system awareness, system activity, and levels of system 
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responsiveness. The consistent theme of configuration states was deviation from “standard procedure”. 
From a work flow standpoint, there might be reasons for deviation from procedural recommendations in 
any given instance, and a key benefit to systematic observation is the ability to provide a context for better 
understanding of why procedures are or are not followed (Klinect, 2005). In each of the three instances 
when cervical collars were not placed, for example, the system was moving forward with a focus on an issue 
and unconsciously deprioritizing protocol. This is best exemplified by the desire of one team to prepare for 
an expected absence of a collar in an extremely high-risk patient and still not placing it. In this instance the 
team leader acknowledged that they simply forgot about it once the patient arrived and remembered only 
when the patient was being moved5. From the standpoint of the observer, this appears to arise from the 
nature of complexity within the trauma bay environment. Protocols were reliably followed when they were 
part of routine practice (e.g. placing a collar) in situations of low acuity. As soon as cognitive stress occurred 
because of the sense that the patient might have a “real” injury, the team’s ability to focus on the cervical 
collar was low even with a high degree of suspicion that a dangerous injury could be present. To understand 
this, one must consider the broader context of the trauma bay. 
     Trauma resuscitation is an unpredictable, high stress environment. Walking into a trauma bay 
to prepare for a resuscitation is accepting the fact that you may soon be watching someone dying in front 
of you. Many of those deaths are unavoidable, but it is still a person – son, daughter, mother, or father –  
who is no more. Furthermore, every team member knows that some patients who come in will require rapid 
decision making and procedural expertise in the first 20 to 60 minutes or they may die when they potentially 
could have been saved (Scott, Hirschinger, Cox, Brandt, & Hall, 2009; Ertel & Kellam, 2015). This makes 
the presentation of a patient with a “real” injury automatically more stressful and demand different cognitive 
energies (Woods,1988). In this context cervical spine injury can lose a great deal of importance because 
patients simply won’t die of an occult cervical cord injury while they very well may die of airway, breathing 
or circulatory abnormalities that are correctable through adequate team action. Unfortunately, those same 
patients may also be harmed by the very system designed to save them if some protocols are not followed. 
While this may not be news to those involved in patient safety, we are left with the undeniable fact that the 
cognitive demands of that stressful environment reliably preclude execution of nonemergent standard 
                                                          
5 This is apparent in the recorded conversation in the room at the time of the observation. 
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protocols (at least as observed in this study). As if that wasn’t a difficult enough situation, even though 
witnessing someone severely injured or dying is a real possibility, 70% of the traumas in this series had no 
injuries whatsoever and the team understood this within seconds of their arrival.  In all of these relatively 
more benign cases a collar was placed even when the team felt it was unnecessary from a medical standpoint. 
They nevertheless dutifully followed procedure – or, rather, they had the cognitive space to follow 
procedure. The primary difference in the cases without collar placement seemed to be focus on a potential 
real problem. Acute concern for a known problem appeared to prevent attention from being given to 
protocol. This cognitive dilemma has been well-described (Kahneman, 2011). 
     At this point, the utility of the COSA is to turn the information back over to the system for 
resolution. The data is transparent and able to be reviewed by both sharp end providers and those who 
manage the system, and it is up to them to work out solutions with guidance from human factors/system 
safety experts. The above description is undertaken only to emphasize the benefits of systematic observation 
of system function at the granular level of work.   
THE HIDDEN COST OF RESILIENT WORK 
     Though Undesired State data alone might seem to be adequate rationale for placing an observer 
to identify risk, we are concerned with how the system tends to behave and if we are to alter the system we 
must have a sense of both what it currently yields and how it does so. Ultimately, we are concerned with 
identifying learning opportunities. The remainder of the TEM cycle can be very instructive about the context 
within which such risk arose. For example, threat analysis is concerned with creating a “threat profile” 
(Klinect, Murray, Merritt, & Helmriech, 2003). What types of complexity does the system have to commonly 
manage? How good are teams at managing threats? What threats, or combinations of threats, appear to 
overwhelm team function? A system must have answers to these types of questions if it is to appropriate 
limited resources effectively. Threat analysis helps a great deal, possibly far more so in medicine than in the 
cockpit, because patient illness/injury is considered a threat, and therefore our work in the hospital could 
fundamentaly be considered the management of threats. Consider for a moment that only a third (31%) of 
the patients entering the trauma bay have real injuries to be managed. All other threats we observed need to 
be analyzed in terms of that number, because low staff, inadequate supplies, multiple traumas and deviations 
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from protocol by EMTs are extremely unlikely to generate risk in a healthy patient6. Our data shows the 
system to be fundamentally handicapped in the ability to care for the people who need their lives saved, and 
yet the outcome data contradicts this (remember our O/E mortality ratio is regularly less than 1). This likely  
contributes, albeit paradoxically, to the healthcare system’s inability to move the bar on patient safety. We 
rely on the resilience of our sharp end to keep things going with consistently inadequate resources, and they 
are so good at it they defeat their own arguments for changing resource allocation to create space for 
improvement. Process evaluations such as COSA are essential to bring such issues to management’s 
awareness.  
         As a method of deciphering path dependency, Klinect analyzes each event, whether Threat, 
Error and Undesired State, in terms of a management index (Klinect, 2005). This is simply the percentage 
of time that any one of those events (T, E or US) is associated with another downstream event (E or US). 
Though satisfactory in the most superficial sense, the management index is only useful for identifying areas 
of high deviation from expected performance; it makes no value judgment regarding either system design 
or performance. Any value judgement must be either brought to the table by the analyst or constructed 
based on the context. When considered in conjunction with teamwork behaviors, however, we can begin to 
see another pattern emerge. A clear correlation begins to develop between certain teamwork behaviors as 
tools for effective TEM. In this series teams that anticipated through planning were much better at 
recognizing and responding to unfolding events and risk was seen to drop precipitously. Effective TEM 
appears, therefore, to be: (1) facilitated by measurable teamwork behaviors, and (2) decrease risk of harm.  
Teamwork behaviors can be considered the human tools for resilient Work as Done. Where the 
communication in the room was free-flowing, and when the leader suggested one or two ideas for how to 
proceed at the beginning, two differences were apparent: the team members showed a strong trend for 
expressing their own ideas and concerns during the progress of the resuscitation, and the teams had a 
marked decrease in physiologic undesired states. Simply put, those teams were able to solve problems that 
                                                          
6 Inadequate room supplies, for example, all revolved around not having some material needed to treat one 
of the critically ill patients. Since the team only looked for that equipment when they had strong suspicion for a problem 
or actually needed it (in the 31% of cases where the patient was ill or reported to be ill), it only appears to be a problem 
9% of the time. It is more meaningful to say that 29% of the time the room was not ready. This is both concerning 
and also speaks to how extremely good the teams are at working around inadequate resources.  
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arose without incurring as much risk. But remember what problems they were solving: inadequate supplies, 
inadequate staff and, of course, some of their own creative deviations from work design.  
     Before turning to a consideration of errors within TEM, consider that the Line Observation 
Safety Audit was developed in the mid-1990s to gain an understanding of the discrepancy between work as 
imagined and work as done in the cockpit. Within this construct, error could easily be defined as “behavior 
differing from work as imagined”. Threat and Error Management (TEM) was subsequently developed to 
organize analysis of task performance by teams (Klinect, 2005). TEM, despite such an arbitrary definition 
of error, is able to function not unlike Newtonian theories of gravity and light were able to be useful even 
if fundamentally untrue. Like Newton’s work, TEM functions as a pretty good approximation of what is 
going on, and, perhaps more insidiously, feels as though it represents the world as we experience it (Rovelli, 
2016). Just as with physics, however, we must ask ourselves if what feels true is the best representation of 
the reality. 
CONSIDERING THE UTILITY OR ERROR 
     Modern neuroscience and psychology postulates that our brains are prediction machines, 
designed to guess what will happen next. This permits efficient organization of our internal system to 
manage ourselves in the world (Seligman, Railton, Baumeister, & Sripada, 2016; Barrett, 2017). Predictive 
organization is an ongoing and background process occurring beyond the bounds of consciousness, and we 
are incompletely aware of it (Kahneman, 2011). This process is undergoing constant autocorrection based 
on moment to moment experience of the world and our internal processes (Barrett, 2017). In this model, 
we explore our work space much as Rasmussen described, modulating effort for probability of success and 
at the same time creating a new work space with our own behavior (Rasmussen, 1988). This workspace is 
the result of our muddling through instantaneously appearing data from both external components in the 
system and the internal workings of the participant actor (Kahneman, 2011). Some of that guesswork will 
be inaccurate, increase the potential for inappropriate behavior, and possibly introduce risk of system failure. 
Thus, we appear to create a probabilistic path dependency through our behaviors as a function of the 
instantaneously present system state. Some have called the actor’s point of view of the system situational 
awareness, and promoted maintaining an accurate understanding of it (Endsley, 2015). It should be easy to 
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see the idea of maintaining situational awareness to be meaningless, however, for it is always being constructed 
and deconstructed (Dekker, 2015).  
     Klinect and Helmreich propose that in evaluating system performance we must therefore be 
concerned with the relatively successful autocorrection of system components, both individually and jointly. 
In that respect TEM is really the outward manifestation of work that is going on internally in all of us. If 
guesswork is the basis for our representation of the world, we should expect both inaccuracies and 
correction in order for successful function. This is how threat management has value as shown above: 
anticipation of possible problems appears to facilitate better recognition of problem states and their 
correction.  
     In the context of real time work, however, the concept of error becomes so diminished and 
arbitrary as to become meaningless (Hollnagel & Amalberti, 2001). Consider a concrete example from one 
of the observations as recorded.  
Trauma pager went off at 1816 as follows: Level 1, 22 yo male, MVC, ETA 8 min. Patient 
was struggling with EMT [Emergency Medical Technician] providers while being wheeled 
in. Patient had splints in place at left ankle and right forearm.  
EMT reported: "22 yo male in MVC, 5 minute extrication, who started seizing enroute.  
TA [Trauma Attending] called out for transfer to trauma bay stretcher while report 
ongoing, as patient was still struggling and staff was working hard to control patient. There 
was no count for the move, EMT asked "is everyone ready? Okay go" and patient was 
moved. TA called out check that the bed was locked.   
TL: "what was your transit time?" 
EMT: "about 20 minutes. He has no past medical history. We gave him 5 of versed" 
TA: "secure the IV, get the first blood pressure and prepare to intubate" 
Throughout all of the above, it continued to take 4 people to hold the patient down.  
 
There are multiple issues involved in this case, and they represent one clear example of the difficulty 
involved in the consideration of the team members’ behavior and the false utility of the concept of error. 
Any evaluation of the behavior forces the question “Should they have done ‘X’?”, where ‘X’ could be any 
of the following: TA waiting for report to finish prior to calling for transfer; formal count to ensure everyone 
ready prior to move; placing cervical collar to protect cervical spine; etc. Indeed, a case could be made for 
any of those as “correct” behavior, and yet the context of the situation created behavior completely different 
from those expectations. If we cannot say they should have done ‘X’, we can certainly say that ‘X’ is in the 
range of expected behaviors. We can say the same, however, of the observed behaviors. Our only recourse, 
therefore, is to describe the events and the execution of tasks. Consider the team behaviors, then as task 
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adaptations, rather than binary <error-not error> events. ALL tasks – mental or physical – are adapted 
minute-to-second-to-nanosecond (e.g. within a person to govern the strength of muscle contraction, the 
preparatory secretion of stress hormones, the depth of inspiration to acquire more oxygen, etc) (Sapolsky, 
1994; Pulakos, Arad, Donovan, & Plamondon, 2000). The cognitive moments of seeing a thrashing, 
combative patient has meaning in the setting of trauma that is not present at all if someone is in a different 
scenario. We cannot say it was “wrong” to immediately intubate this patient, nor that it would have been 
“right” to attempt to sedate them with medication or even conversation first. We can say that this 
instantiation of a trauma resuscitation rapidly protected the patient’s airway (a primary concern for every 
trauma), permitted diagnostic work-up to proceed quickly, and (though not described in this short section) 
permitted rapid treatment of a few essential and time dependent injuries.  
     Klinect accounts for this type of event in his analysis by permitting observers to code protocol 
violations with “intentional noncompliance” – a sort of error-with-an-asterisk-attached7. Though this 
sounds potentially damning, he means it simply as “the actor made a conscious decision to do ‘a’ instead of 
the expected ‘b’”. Rather than a condemnation, it is transcribed as a simple observation. Even if that is the 
case, how does knowing this help the individual system components, or even the system as a whole? It can 
only help as we understand the context of the decision, and when framed as a question of how the system 
created the behavior as the best option for the actor from his point of view (Woods, Dekker, Cook, & 
Johannesen, 2010).  
     Health care adds another kink in the armor for TEM as an observational filter. Klinect’s model 
asks us to accept that all undesired states are the result of team error. I cannot speak for the cockpit, but if 
we are asking how safe we can become while caring for patients, and how much risk we can avoid, Undesired 
States must include events that are known to be life-threatening, only occur because of intervention, and 
still are the result of absolutely sound medical practice. Consider hemostasis (appropriate clotting of blood) 
as an example. There is no debate surrounding the idea that controlling hemorrhage is paramount in 
avoiding major complications and death during trauma resuscitations. Once a trauma patient is admitted to 
the hospital and hemorrhage is controlled, however, they are at risk for clotting in their major veins, 
                                                          
7 This event was coded exactly that way – as intentional noncompliance in stabilizing cervical spine. From 
one point of view, the only way to achieve airway protection and spinal stabilization was to take control of the patient 
through intubation. Intentional noncompliance becomes the way to document a workaround. 
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subsequent pulmonary embolism, and death. Protocols exist, as they should, for prophylaxis against such 
complications, but the effective protocols involve administration of blood thinners. Blood thinners can 
cause bleeding, and we occasionally see subsequent massive bleeding in patients caused directly by our own 
best efforts to prevent fatal pulmonary emboli. Clearly any secondary hemorrhage due to blood thinners is 
an Undesired State. It did not arise from team error, however, but from perfect team performance. Any 
analysis of risk creation, therefore, must not limit itself only to behavior that is outside the bounds of Work 
as Imagined; it must expand to include how each agent adapted to the situation as it unfolded.     
     Replacing ‘error’ with ‘adapted task’ is completely consistent with the initial goals of LOSA. The 
conceptualization of the LOSA isolated observations of individual behavior from receiving feedback or task 
specific learning specifically to achieve as close-to-normal behavior as possible in the cockpit. This allows 
us to learn qualitative information about the system. Suddenly we have the capacity for tremendous power, 
just as Helmreich and Klinect intended (Helmriech, Klinect, & Wilhelm, 1998). We can now ask two crucial 
questions. First, how accurate, or even useful, is work as imagined? Second, how successful is work as done? 
These are fundamentally different and equally important questions. They are nevertheless regularly blurred 
in our discussions of work simply because the concept of error clouds our vision. Each of these questions 
deserves a separate answer. 
HOW SUCCESSFUL IS WORK AS DONE? 
     Klinect used the metaphor of defensive driving as a useful way to think about threat and error 
management within the cockpit. His metaphor rests on considering the key to pilot success to be anticipation 
of potential trouble, recognition of problems (and potential problems) as soon as they arise, and effective 
management of sudden risk (Merritt & Klinect, 2006). In this model we are primarily concerned not with 
the problem of error, nor with the problem of threats, but with the process of work. This process, 
irrespective of our expertise, training, or system design, will include both intuitive and deliberative 
performance on the part of the humans involved (Railton, 2016). Irrespective of the mode of the behavior, 
we must be concerned with these efforts as process rather than outcome. Let us consider an example: If I 
get in my car and drive to the hospital, and no-one is run off the road, and I don’t get in an accident, and 
arrive at the hospital on time, then I am successful. We all know that a large portion of that drive will occur 
outside my consciousness, operating in Kahneman’s System 1 mode (Kahneman, 2011). In that mode I will 
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make many small adjustments to the curves, the rates of speed in the other cars on the road. I might drive 
with the radio on, or with or without a GPS. I might drive with one or the other hand on the wheel, or have 
my hands in the 10 and 2 o’clock position or the 5 and 7 o’clock position. Any hand position I could have 
on the wheel could only be considered a task adaption rather than an error, as I would have violated no 
driving laws. Good systematic observation, however, would note how often my hands changed position, 
where I tended to have them, and how I responded to road conditions in each of the various positions. It 
would also note the presence of GPS, my gazing at the sunrise or details I passed by, and what radio station 
was on, and perhaps whether the station played music or was news. All of these details create context for 
my behavior. Finally, it would also note when I braked as I approached cars, the speed at which I took 
curves, and it would integrate the other data re: radio, hand position, etc., to create a narrative of my drive. 
Followed in a prospective fashion, many levels of detail will be lost, but some behaviors, such as those I 
mentioned and likely countless more you could imagine, will be big enough to catch the eye of the observer.  
     Moving from the normatively based observation confined to errors to this more broadly 
contextual approach is extremely liberating. First, there need be no judgement involved in something like 
hand position on the steering wheel. Second, it opens a much larger field of behavior for analysis. If the 
concept of error only asks us to get over a hypothetical performance bar, the concept of task adaptation 
permits the sky to be the limit in terms of performance. Much of the behavior will be noise rather than 
signal, and it requires careful analysis to see associative patterns (e.g. the inverse association of patient injury 
severity and likelihood of following spinal precautions in this series). These cannot be considered causal, 
but they certainly can shape discussion within the system as it learns how it performs.  
     Such optimism regarding the abandonment of normative behavior as a measurement, however, 
should not cloud our eyes to the fact that some behavior may be contextually egregious because of the extra-
ordinary high risk it creates – e.g. choosing to drive on the left side of the road in the Unites States, or under 
intoxication. Some behaviors, though they may be correctly classified as task adaptations, can be considered 
wide enough deviations that the system is forced to consider them egregious violations. These egregious 
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examples, however, are not considered error either, as in each case they have proceeded to the level of 
illegal.8  
     What does this mean for our analysis of observed performance? To answer our question “How 
successful is Work as Done?”, we cannot simply look at outcome, because it tells us nothing of the cost in 
terms or resources or effort. Sustainability mandates relative efficiency and safety, and we (as a System) must 
know the costs of that performance freedom. One type of example was offered with respect to team 
resilience in the face of inadequate resources. Another prime example is how well procedures are followed 
when acuity is low. The consideration of the failure to follow protocol in the high acuity cases is only 
meaningful when considered in the context of how reliably the cervical collar was placed during the low 
acuity cases. Suppose for a moment, I returned the data on failing to apply the collar 12% of the time to the 
trauma service as a simple statistic. It is not hard to imagine the wasted training time spent to remind most 
teams of the need for the collar, including the data regarding the times occult injuries were missed. No-one 
pays attention to such training because they already have that knowledge, and we all know the outcome of 
such trainings: they typically fail. This series offers a clue as to why: since the system reliably follows the 
protocol when there is no perceived clinical reason to do so, and only deviates in the settings where the risk 
is actually higher, the problem isn’t lack of desire or understanding of the importance for following “the 
rules”. The “problem”, if there is one, is that those rules exist outside the bounds of specific diagnosis or 
treatment, and we can therefore become effectively blind to them when specific problem solving begins 
(Kahneman, 2011). 
HOW USEFUL IS WORK AS IMAGINED? 
     The goals for system safety must always be partially contradictory: move the mean performance 
to a desired setting and control the standard deviation of this performance, but maintain the capability for 
variability in response to system stress (Rochlin, 1999; Bergstrom, van Winsen, & Henriqson, 2015; Woods, 
2015). Deviation from expected performance should be the norm in nearly every systematic observation of 
a biological system at work (Gould, 1996). One goal of systematic observation, therefore, must always be to 
modify both Work as Imagined, and Work as Done. Work as Imagined is useful only as a starting point for 
                                                          
8 In each of those descriptions, from the vantage point of Threat Management and Task Adaptation, the 
driver has progressed beyond simple task adaptation and moved to the realm of Undesired State. The adapted task 
preceded the more egregious violation (e.g. putting the car into gear while intoxicated). 
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us to learn what we (those inside and outside) don’t understand about the system. If we observe work being 
done only to constrain it to the limits of Work as Imagined, we will fail to see emerging threats over time, 
just as we will fail to see adaptive successes. The question must always be: what have we learned about the 
current reality of Work as Imagined, and how should it be modified to optimize system performance? The 
tension between these two is most visible in concepts such as procedural drift or normalization of deviance 
(Snook, 2000; Vaughn, 1996). In each case the problem was not the presence of system change, but failure 
to understand it as present (Woods, 2005). Rather than use systematic observation to ask how we need to 
fix component performance, we can ask how we need to modify the system to optimize component 
performance. This perspective shift changes how we think about observation in subtle but fundamental 
ways. Nothing is inherently wrong with measuring Work as Done against Work as Imagined, but it can be 
done more beneficially without invoking the concept of error. As the sole observer I am aware of the 
classification of each “error” coded, as well as the round table discussions held regarding each of them. All 
events coded as error could easily have been considered as task adaptations as this term encompasses 
Reason’s slips, lapses and mistakes as well as concepts such as “intentional noncompliance”. It also includes 
examples such as the example below:  
[As background, this patient is elderly, was intubated in the field because of unresponsiveness, was 
hemodynamically unstable and had exsanguinating hemorrhage from an open fracture of her left leg, for 
which a tourniquet has been placed. The team has been working to stabilize her for about 40 minutes prior 
to this section of the narrative. The numbers on the left starting with 1756 are military time designations.] 
1756 TA asked for verification of resuscitation fluids to date. PrimaryRN answered 
“4, 4 and 4 plus 4 liters of crystalloid. TA asked for another 500cc bolus. Team is then 
waiting as foley catheter is inserted. 
1759 Foley in.  
1800 Repeat ABG drawn. BP 127/62, HR 89, saturation 100%. 
ScribeRN asked for vent settings. PrimaryRN answered “AC/17/500/100%/PEEP 5 and 
LR 200/hr” 
1804 PrimaryRN checked foley catheter and said “Temp 93.9” 
1805 EDA [Emergency Department Attending] noted patient blinking eyes. 
Assisting SR [Senior Resident] noted patient moving and suggested as an aside: “they 
should get 100mcg of fentanyl”. No one acknowledged, nor did SR pursue suggestion 
further. 
1806 PrimaryRN asked if team was done with rapid transfuser. TA answered “no”. 
ABG returned with lactate 6.7 
1808 TA announced to deflate lower extremity tourniquet and it was done. TA 
called for 4 more units to be delivered at 1:1. 
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1809 Temp now 94.8. BP 112/48 and HR 85. TA announced “the pressures are 
okay, we can go to CT”. Team began to arrange patient for transfer to CT. Lines from the 
IV pole holding the arterial line were connected to the IV pole attached to the head of the 
bed under the direction of the TA. 
1813 A-line reading now difficult to get. “4 more units PRBCs in” called out by 
PrimaryRN. Team reviewed A-line to examine difficulty. Line had been clamped during 
movement to the new IV pole. Line was unclamped, and pressures now 143/69. 
PrimaryRN called out “are foley, a-line and respiratory therapist ready?” RT [Respiratory 
Therapist]: “ready” 
1816  Patient suddenly sat up on stretcher. BP noted to be 117/51. EDA noticed 
and with RNs quickly and easily laid patient back to stretcher. TA called out for 2mg versed 
please”. A few moments later TA stated “give 100mcg fentanyl before the versed”. Both 
were administered and patient sedated.  
1817  PrimaryRN: “2 units more FFP in” PrimaryRN asked where the crash cart 
was. TA inquired as to why. ScribeRN stated “you should get the RSI [Rapid Sequence 
Intubation kit] from the cart in case you need to paralyze her in CT. TA: “I agree.” 
PrimaryRN returned with RSI. RNs crosschecked foley and line placement, and 
transported patient to CT scanner. 
 
What do we see here? The answer is, of course, “whatever you look for” (Lundberg, Rollenhagen, 
& Hollnaged, 2009). First consider one simple detail: the arterial line is inadvertently clamped when changing 
poles for transport. This is precisely the sort of work Helmriech and Klinect had in mind in developing 
TEM as a model for normal cockpit work. It is also the kind of work we recognize as ubiquitous in daily 
life. Furthermore, it is quickly recognized and addressed – in the TEM world the team performed very well 
here, because they immediately identified a problem they created, diagnosed the cause and fixed it, 
preventing it from becoming a link to other events.  
     A more subtle event is the assisting senior resident who noted that since this patient had blinked 
and moved she might be waking up, they should medicate her. I noted this as the observer because his 
statement “they should get 100 micrograms of fentanyl” was quietly stated under his breath, as if it was an 
idea that occurred to him, but as if he was watching the episode unfold on television rather than directly in 
front of him. Work as Imagined, however, dictates the suggestion should be repeated until acknowledged 
by another team member and a decision made. I considered this behavior worth noting because all possible 
spoken words are transcribed, and I was forced to consider it an “error” only because TEM doesn’t permit 
anything else. Though the roundtable agreed this was acceptable referenced against WAI, we all understood 
the resident’s behavior as entirely normal. This is exactly the type of gray area that would most benefit from 
broadening to something like “task adaptation”. The behavior may have been poorly executed, but the term 
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“error” seems inarticulate at best, and overly damning at worst. Interestingly, I considered this notable 
behavior to follow not because of his judgment, but because it wasn’t the communication technique we 
teach. Had he repeated the suggestion, gotten acknowledgement from the Trauma Attending his task would 
have been completed. If the Trauma Attending had considered his request but decided against it, there 
would also not have been an error – it is an acceptable judgement call to make. This is especially so in this 
case because the team has been working so hard to control the patient’s hypotension. Dosing the patient 
for sedation could be expected to drop her blood pressure, and waiting for the patient to move a bit more 
might be exactly what an experienced physician would do. Despite that, during Data Cleaning all participants 
agreed that the patient sitting upright was an Undesired State, and therein lies the crux of the problem. We 
can easily agree on Undesired States, but then we treat the behavior that gets us there very differently (Bosk, 
1979; Marx, 2001). We quickly become appropriately uncomfortable with the term error because it only 
describes the orientation of the observer, never that of the participant. Task Adaptation, on the other hand, 
should work from the same place that we teach teams to debrief. This involves three questions, none of 
which involve error: What went well? What would you like to do differently? What will you do to make that 
change? Note that there is nothing preventing the answers from the first two questions from being identical. 
The example from the narrative above illustrates this perfectly. We could just as easily say the visiting senior 
resident did exceptional work by showing up to the activation for which he was not required to offer 
assistance (especially in the context of routinely understaffed teams). We could say he did an excellent job 
noting the patient moving and advocating for more pain medication. And even he might finally suggest a 
way he would like to do the same behaviors differently in the future, none of which requires or is even 
helped by the concept of error. Furthermore, he might have simply been thinking out loud, and decided not 
to pursue his suggestion because he realized the blood pressure might drop and this would be 
counterproductive, thus effectively censoring his own verbalizations as he chose to learn while watching the 
process unfold. We simply can’t know – and probably even he can rarely know for sure – how all those 
ideas played out in his head.  
STUDY LIMITATIONS 
     Discussion of the specific results of a study such as this is extremely difficult because of the 
sensitivity with which the data much be treated. The success of the entire process is based entirely on the 
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trust of the observed, which includes the institution. Only the most general findings have been able to be 
shared, and hopefully they have been sufficient to spur interest in this type of work. The short segments of 
narrative are consistent with those used in LOSA training, and even found as examples on the FAA circular 
describing the LOSA process (FAA, 2006).  
     The limitations of this pilot study largely relate to its small sample and the inherent difficulty 
with systematic observation. Sample size may have limited analysis of some types of threats or errors. 
Recommendations for LOSA are a minimum of 50 observations, and it appears that 50 to 100 observations 
would also be best for COSA (Klinect, 2005). Nevertheless, some clear patterns were able to emerge even 
at this small number of observations. We believe we have actionable information for targeted improvement 
based on the data collected. Furthermore, we are confident in the utility of COSA to accurately delineate 
creation and mitigation of risk in vivo.   
     The major liability of systematic observation is related to bias. Every observer will develop a 
patterned way of watching the flow of an event, and it this will confer both advantages and disadvantages. 
Every effort was made to attend to all spoken dialogue within the activation and follow responses. 
Observations were also systematically organized to record sequence of events and timing of milestone 
events such as team member arrival, checklist usage, and time to all diagnostic measures throughout the 
activation. This helped keep the observations focused and sufficiently broad. Use of s single observer in this 
case offers both the advantage of internal observational consistency, as well as greatly increasing espertise, 
but at the expense of a singular point of view. Bias toward specific errors, threats or management was 
addressed through the multidisciplinary data cleaning round tables. LOSA typically discards roughly 20% of 
errors, and typically adds errors to about 20% of the observations (Klinect-personal communication). No 
errors were discarded from our observations by the Round Table participants, however, though several were 
added from review of the narratives. The consensus among the round table participants was that the 
narratives were objective and clear. Nevertheless, multiple observers may offer significantly different 
perspectives, and it is probably beneficial to have at least a few different observers.  
     Systematic observation relies on observing behavior approximating normal operations as closely 
as possible. LOSA operational characteristics have been clearly defined and were closely followed. Our data 
from questioning staff on their opinions of team behaviors indicates that we probably observed very close 
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to normal behavior. From 30 observations of between 6-19 people present, only two people queried felt 
behavior had changed due to the observation. The first was a nurse, though she was overheard voicing her 
opinion and countered immediately by a second nurse in the room who emphatically stated the opposite. 
The second was a surgeon who admitted that he wouldn’t have worn a protective gown if the observation 
hadn’t been occurring. Finally, since I am regularly in the trauma bay as part of my normal work flow, I can 
attest to the fact that what I saw during observations was typical of what I see and hear when I’m working 
alongside the staff.  
CONCLUSION 
     We are at a similar time in the development of safety in medical practice as aviation was in the 
mid-1990s; established teamwork skills and clinical treatment guidelines exist to guide the process of care, 
yet an unsatisfactory level of harm still occurs (Makary & Daniel, 2016). Furthermore, clinicians lack an 
integrated understanding of teamwork as an essential practice in the care of the patient (Carney, West, Neily, 
Mills, & Bagian, 2010). Though they may receive some teamwork training, nontechnical skills required in 
teamwork most often remain abstract concepts without clear utility in everyday practice. We tend to become 
like our patients, expecting to need the “medicine” of teamwork skills only in a crisis, and not understanding 
that only daily practice keeps our systems healthy (Greenberg, et al., 2007). We must integrate teamwork 
skills as usable tools in the way clinicians intuitively go about their work (King & Harden, 2013). It is a 
striking finding that ATLS algorithms in and of themselves do not address teamwork concepts. The 
algorithms are usable from a clinical care standpoint, but they leave out goals and information sharing 
methods known to be critical to effective work (Endsley, 1995; Bergrström, Dahlström, Henriqson, & 
Dekker, 2010).  
       The literature written by pilots when they were first exposed to Threat and Error Management 
makes very clear that they understood teamwork differently in light of TEM. Suddenly teamwork skills were 
tools to help them manage the threats and errors they encountered effectively, rather than “charm school” 
(Tullo, 2010). TEM became so fundamental to the work of pilots it is now taught in the earliest phases of 
flight training. Most physicians and staff I have encountered intuitively understand TEM and Task 
Adaptation in similar fashion.  
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     One of the great values of TEM-based COSA is not only to detect normal work flow, but to 
see what situations tend to overwhelm teams and how they adapt to the situations they are given using 
necessary efficiency-thoroughness tradeoffs. Honest evaluation of the teams’ work flow will inevitably show 
that some of these tradeoffs are a wise use of resources given the situation. A method that professionals 
trust as reflective of their own work flow (whether they lead to failures or successes) can promote staff 
engagement in learning about system, team, and personal function. The operational characteristics built into 
LOSA, and adapted as strictly as possible by us, successfully created that environment. We believe that our 
data has provided us with clear and achievable targets for improvement in our teamwork processes. Most 
importantly, our teams found the process to be both enlightening and empowering in terms of self-directing 
their own efforts to change behavior. This work is fundamental to our psychology and to navigating all 
activities with success not only as evaluated in terms of outcome, but also in terms of the human experiences 
of purpose, joy and meaning (Barrett, 2017; Conklin, 2016; Frush, Leonard, & Frankel Allan, 2013; Leape, 
et al., 2012). Though specifically employed in Trauma Activations during this pilot study, we believe this 
work is adaptable in a myriad of clinical situations, from the procedural suite to the intensive care unit.  
     Despite the inherent value perceived in systematic observation, as well as the utility of TEM as 
a starting point, it is clear that the concept of error is more limiting than useful, and actually erodes 
contextual understanding of events. Considering all tasks – whether cognitive or physical – in terms of their 
adaptive utility is richer and more meaningful, and it this analysis I propose to explore in the future. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
     There are several people without whom this project would have proved even more daunting 
and certainly either it, or I, would have emerged appearing completely different. In chronological order: 
first, thanks to James Klinect, and Hawaiian Airlines for agreeing to have an interested surgeon attend and 
observer training session, and for ongoing discussion during and after the project. Thanks to John Cooley 
for flying to Hawaii and sharing my interest in this work, and Lynn Hubert for being willing to learn and 
observe in the initial pilot series. Thanks to Azlyn Goff and Alexey Abramov, for their efforts in assisting 
with organizing data and building the database. Next, thanks to the trauma service for bravely trusting this 
process and me personally. Special thanks to the Director of Trauma, Corrado Marini, and the quality team 
under Renee Garrick for unwavering support. 
     Thanks to Steve Montague for suggesting the Lund program; friends like that are a great 
blessing. Lund proved to be the perfect place to thoughtfully consider the implications of the observation 
process and its results. Throughout the Masters program both Johan Bergström and Anthony Smoker 
remained the perfect mentors. Lund is unbelievably lucky to have them. Extra thanks to JB for agreeing to 
guide me through this thesis, especially after having to read so much of my writing in Course 1. 
     Finally, thanks to my wife Gina, and my daughters Eliza and Sasha, for alternately permitting 
me to ignore them while working, and accept listening to me ramble about my ideas, as well as my new love 
for Lund and Sweden.  
43 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Amalberti, R. (2013). Navigating Safety: Necessary Compromises and Trade-offs - Theory and Practice. Dordrecht: 
Springer. 
ATLS. (2012). Advanced Trauma Life Support Student Manual. Chicago: American College of Surgeons. 
Barrett, L. F. (2017). How emotions are made. New York : Houghton Mifflin Harcourt. 
Bergrstrom, J., Dahlstrom, N., Henriqson, E., & Dekker, S. (2010). Team coordination in escalating 
situations: An empirical study using mid-fidelity simulation. Journal of Contingencies and Crisis 
Management, 18(4), 220-230. 
Bergstrom, J., van Winsen, R., & Henriqson, E. (2015). On the rationale of resilience in the domain of 
safety: a literature review. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 131-141. Retrieved from 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ress.2015.03.008i 
Bosk, C. L. (1979). Forgive and remember - managing medical failure. Chicago, IL: The Univeristy of Chicago Press. 
Braithwaite, J., Wears, R. L., & Hollnagel, E. (2015). Resilient health care: Turning patient safety on its head. 
International Journal for Quality in Health Care, 27(5), 418-420. 
Branlat, M., & Woods, D. D. (2010). How do Systems Manage Their Adaptive Capacity to Successfully 
Handly Disruptions? A Resilience Engineering Perspective. Complex Adaptive Systems - Resilience, 
Robustness and Evolvability: Papers from the AAAI Fall Symposium (pp. 26-34). Association for the 
Advancement of Artificial Intelligence. 
Carney, B. T., West, P., Neily, J., Mills, P. D., & Bagian, J. P. (2010). Differences in nurse and surgeon 
perceptions of teamwork: implications for the use of a briefing checklist in the OR. Journal of 
American Operating Room Nurse, 91(6), 722-729. 
Cassel, C. K., & Reuben, D. B. (2011). Specialization, subspecialization, and subsubspecialization in internal 
medicine. New England Journal of Medicine, 364(2), 1169-1173. 
Conklin, T. (2016). Better questions: An applied approach to operational learning. Boca Raton, Florida: CRC Press. 
Dekker, S. (2015). The danger of losing situational awareness. Cognitive Technology and Work, 159-161. 
Dekker, S., & Hollnagel, E. (2004). Human factors and folk models. Cognitive Technology and Work, 79-86. 
Endsley, M. (2015). Situation awareness: operationally necessary and scientifically grounded. Cogntive 
Technology and Work, 163-167. 
Endsley, M. R. (1995). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37(1), 
32-64. 
Engestrom, Y. (2000). Activity theory as a framework for analyzing and redisigning work. Ergonomics, 43(7) 
960-974. 
Ertel, W. K., & Kellam, J. F. (2015). General assessment and management of the polytrauma patient. In M. 
TIle, D. L. Helfet, J. F. Kellam, & M. Vrahas, Fractures of the Pelvis and Acetabulum: Principles and 
Methods of Management, 4th Ed (pp. 61-82). Davos Platz: AO Foundation. 
44 
 
FAA. (2006). Advisory circular: Line operation safety audits. Washintgon, D.C.: Federal Aviation Administration. 
Frush, K., Leonard, M., & Frankel Allan. (2013). Effective teamwork and communication. In M. Leonard, 
A. Frankel, F. Frederico, K. Frush, & C. Haraden, The essential guide for patient safety officers, 2nd Edition 
(pp. 53-68). Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois: Joint Commission Resources. 
Frush, K., Maynard, L., Koeble, C., & Schwendimann, R. (2013). Regulating and monitoring teamwork in 
healthcare: Issues and challenges. In K. Frush, & E. Salas, Improving Patient Safety Through Teamwork 
and Team Training (pp. 94-104). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Gawande, A. (2011, October 3). Personal Best. The New Yorker. Retrieved from 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2011/10/03/personal-best 
Gould, S. J. (1996). The Bare Bones of Natural Selection. In S. J. Gould, Full House: The Spread of Excellence 
from Plato to Darwin (pp. 135-146). New York: Harmony Books. 
Greenberg, C. C., Regenbogen, S. E., Studdert, D. M., Lipsitz, S. R., Rogers, S. O., Zinner, M. J., & Gawande, 
A. A. (2007). Patterns of communication breakdowns resulting in injury to surgical patients. Journal 
of the Amerian College of Surgeons, 204(4), 533-540. 
Hansson, T. (2015). Contemporary approaches to activity theory. Hershey, PA: IGI Global. 
Helmriech, R. L., Klinect, J. R., & Wilhelm, J. A. (1998). Models of Threat, Error and CRM in Flight 
Operations. Retrieved September 20, 2013, from http://flightsafety.org/archives-and-
resources/threat-and-error-managment-tem 
Hollnagel, E., & Amalberti, R. (2001). The Emperor's New Clothes or Whatever Happened to "Human 
Error"? Proceedings of the 3rd Conference on Human Error and System Safety Development. Linkoping, 
Sweden. 
Jauhar, S. (2014, August 9). One patient, too many doctors: The terrible expense of overspecialization. Time. 
Retrieved January 15, 2018, from http://time.com/3138561/specialist-doctors-high-cost/ 
Jordan, G. L. (1985). The impact of specialization on health care. Annals of Surgery, 201(5), 537-544. 
Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. New York: Farrar,Straus and Giroux. 
Kalkwarf, K. J., & Cotton, B. A. (2017, December). Resuscitation for hypovolemic shock. Surgical Cinics of 
North America, 97(6), 1307-1321. 
Kant, V. (2016). Supporting the human life-raft in confrontin the juggernaut of technology: Jens Rasmussen 
1961-1986. Applied Ergonomics, 1-11. 
Klinect, J. R. (2005). Line operations safety audit: A cockpit observation methodology for monitoring commercial airline 
safety performance. Austin, TX: The University of Texas at Austin. 
Klinect, J. R., Murray, P., Merritt, A., & Helmriech, R. (2003). Line Operation Safety Audits (LOSA): 
Definition and Operating Characteristics. Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium on Aviation 
Psychology (pp. 663-668). Dayton, OH: The Ohio State University. 
Kohn, L. T., Corrigan, J. M., & Donaldson, M. S. (2000). To err is human: building a safer health system. 
Washington, D.C.: Institute of Medicine. 
45 
 
Leape, L. L., Shore, M. F., Dienstag, J. L., Mayer, R. J., Edgman-Levitan, S., Meyer, G. S., & Healy, G. B. 
(2012). A culture of respect, part 2: Creating a culture of respect. Academic Medicine, 87(7), 853-858. 
Lundberg, J., Rollenhagen, C., & Hollnaged, E. (2009). What-you-look-for-is-what-you-find: The 
consequences of underlying accident models in eight accident investigation manuals. Safety Science, 
47(10), 1297-1311. 
Makary, M. A., & Daniel, M. (2016). Medical error - the third leading cause of death in the US. British Medical 
Journal, 353, i2139. 
Marx, D. (2001). Patient Safety and the "Just Culture": A Primer for Health Care Executives. New York, NY: 
Columbia University. 
Maurino, D. (2005). Threat and error management . Vancouver, BC: Canadian Aviation Safety Seminar. 
Retrieved from http://flightsafety.org/files/maurino.doc 
Merritt, A., & Klinect, J. (2006). Defensive Driving for Pilots: An introduction to Threat and Error Management. 
Austin: The LOSA Collaborative. Retrieved January 5, 2013, from 
https://flightsafety.org/files/tem_dspt_12-6-06.pdf 
Perry, S. J., & Wears, R. L. (2012). Underground adaptations: case studies from health care. Cognitive 
Technology and Work, 14, 253-260. 
Perry, S. J., Wears, R. L., & McDonald, S. S. (2013). Implementing team training in the emergency 
department: The good, the bad, the unexpected and the problematic. In K. Frush, & E. Salas, 
Improving Patient Safety Through Teamwork and Team Training (pp. 129-135). New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
Pulakos, E. D., Arad, S., Donovan, M. A., & Plamondon, K. E. (2000). Adaptability in the workplace: 
Development of a taxonomy of adaptive performance. Journal of Applied Psychology, 85(4), 612-624. 
Railton, P. (2016). Introducing Homo prospectus. In M. E. Seligman, P. Railton, R. F. Baumeister, & C. 
Sripada, Homo prospectus (pp. 7-31). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rasmussen, J. (1988). Human error mechanisms in complex work environments. Reliability Engineering and 
System Safety, 22, 155-167. 
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk Management in a Dynamic Society: A Modelling Problem. Safety Science, 2(2/3), 
183-213. 
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Reason, J. (2008). The Human Contribution: Unsafe Acts, Accidents and Heroic Recoveries. Surrey, England: Ashgate 
Publishing Company. 
Rochlin, G. I., La Porte, T. R., & Roberts, K. H. (1987, Autumn). The Self-Designing High-Reliability 
Organization: Aircraft Carrier Flight Operations at Sea. Naval War College Review, pp. 76-90. 
Salas, E., Prince, C., Baker, D. P., & Shrestha, L. (1995). Situation Awareness in Team Perfromance: 
Indications for Measurement and Training. Human Factors, 37(1), 123-136. 
46 
 
Salmon, P. M., Walker, G. H., & Stanton, N. A. (2015). Broken components versus broken systems: why it 
is systems not people that lose situational awareness. Cognitive Technology and Work, 17(2), 179-183. 
Sapolsky, R. M. (1994). Why Zebras Don't Get Ulcers. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 
Scott, S. D., Hirschinger, L. E., Cox, K. R., Brandt, J., & Hall, L. W. (2009). The natural history of recovery 
for the healthcare provider "second victim" after adverse patient events. Quality and Safety in Health 
Care, 18, 325-330. 
Seligman, M. E., Railton, P., Baumeister, R. F., & Sripada, C. (2016). Homo prospectus. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
The Joint Commission. (2008, July 9). Behaviors that undermine a culture of safety. 
https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/18/SEA_40.PDF: The Joint Commission. 
The Joint Commission. (2016). Comprehensive certification manual for disease-specific care. 
https://www.jointcommission.org/assets/1/6/DSC_05_SE_update_CURRENT.pdf: The Joint 
Commission. 
Tullo, F. J. (2010). Teamwork and organizational factors. In B. G. Kanki, R. L. Helmreich, & J. Anca, Crew 
Resource management, 2nd Ed. (pp. 59-78). San Diego, California: Elsevier. 
Woods, D. D. (1988). Coping with Complexity: The psychology of human behavior in complex systems. In 
L. P. Goodstein, H. B. Andersen, & S. E. Olsen, Tasks, Errors and Mental Models (pp. 128-148). 
London: Taylor and Francis. 
Woods, D. D. (2015). Four concepts for resilience and the implications for the future of resilience 
engineering. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 5-9. 
Woods, D. D., & Hollnagel, E. (2006). Joint Cognitive Systems: Pattens in Cognitive Systems Engineering. Boca 
Raton: Taylor & Francis Group. 
Woods, D. D., Dekker, S., Cook, R., & Johannesen, L. (2010). Behind Human Error. Burlington: Ashgate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
 
© Copyright: Division of Risk Management and Societal Safety, Faculty 
of Engineering 
Lund University, Lund 20XX  
Avdelningen för Riskhantering och samhällssäkerhet, Lunds 
tekniska högskola, Lunds universitet, Lund 20XX. 
 
Division of Risk Management and 
Societal Safety  
Faculty of Engineering 
Lund University 
P.O. Box 118 
SE-221 00 Lund 
Sweden 
 
http://www.risk.lth.se 
 
Riskhantering och samhällssäkerhet 
Lunds tekniska högskola 
Lunds universitet 
Box 118 
221 00 Lund 
 
http://www.risk.lth.se 
 
Telefon: 046 - 222 73 60 
 
